RAPID E-PROCUREMENT TOOLKIT
ACCELERATING E-PROCUREMENT SOLUTIONS

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS

THE WORLD BANK
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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
CA	Contracting Authority (also known as Procuring Entity)
CPB	Central Procurement Body
e-GP	Electronic Government Procurement (the term "e-GP" refers to the overall electronic public procurement national setting of a country, including the legal framework, institutional arrangements and capacity, e-Procurement system, etc.)
EO	Economic Operator (also known as Supplier)
e-Procurement	Electronic procurement (the term "e-Procurement" refers to an actual ICT system implementation that supports electronic public procurement)
FA	Framework Agreement
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
LIB	Limited International Bidding
MSME	Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
OCDS	Open Contracting Data Standard
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
TCO	Total Cost of Ownership
WB	World Bank

1 INTRODUCTION

The World Bank has developed a set of procurement indicators that can be used to monitor the implementation of electronic government procurement, or e-GP. These indicators are grouped according to the following strategic directions:

- e-GP adoption
- e-GP performance
- Use of e-GP in World Bank (WB)–funded projects

This document describes these WB indicators, and for each indicator identifies:

- what it attempts to measure
- the formula used to calculate its value, where possible
- what constitutes a “good” value for the indicator

Finally, a cross-reference between the strategic objectives of e-GP and the indicators is provided.

2 WORLD BANK PROCUREMENT INDICATORS

All algorithms related to data collected from an e-Procurement system, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the Comments column.

WORLD BANK PROCUREMENT INDICATORS					ADDITIONAL DETAILS	
Strategy Direction	**Policy Goal**	**Synthetic Indicator**	**Code**	**Basic Algorithm**	**Explanation**	**Comments**
ADOPTION of e-GP **[first direction]**	Full adoption of e-GP (engagement)	Value of contracts formed through e-GP (% of total public procurement)	1.1.1.1	Value of contracts awarded through e-Submission $\frac{Value\ of\ e{-}submitted\ contracts}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts}$ x 100	A high percentage reflects adoption of electronic procedures for high-value purchases.	These algorithms relate to data retrieved from both an e-Procurement system and other sources.
			1.1.1.2	Value of goods, services, and works contracts awarded through e-Submission $\frac{Value\ of\ e{-}submitted\ goods\ contracts}{Total\ value\ fo\ good\ contracts}$ x 100 $\frac{Value\ of\ e-submitted\ services\ contracts}{Total\ value\ of\ services\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ e-submitted\ works\ contracts}{Total\ value\ of\ works\ contracts} \times 100$		
			1.1.1.3	Value of contracts awarded by a CPB or through a centralized purchasing arrangement $\frac{\text{Value of contracts awarded by a CPB or through a centralised purchasing arrangement}}{\text{Total value of contracts}} \times 100$	A higher value indicates aggregation of demand is taking place.	These algorithms relate to data retrieved from both an e-Procurement system and other sources. The awarded values relate to actual

						purchases and not estimated ones.
		Volume of contracts formed through e-GP (% of total number of contracts)	1.1.2.1	Number of contracts awarded through e-Submission $\frac{Number\ of\ e-submitted\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	A high percentage reflects a high adoption rate of electronic procedures.	These algorithms relate to data retrieved from both an e-Procurement system and other sources.
			1.1.2.2	Number of goods, services, and works contracts awarded through e-Submission $\frac{Number\ of\ e-submitted\ goods\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ goods\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ e-submitted\ services\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ services\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ e-submitted\ works\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ works\ contracts} \times 100$		
			1.1.2.3	Number of contracts awarded through a centralized versus decentralized process $\frac{\text{Number of contracts awarded by a CPB or through a centralised purchasing arrangement}}{\text{Number value of contracts}} \times 100$	A higher value indicates more aggregation of demand is taking place.	
	Increased participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in e-GP	Value and volume of contracts with SMEs as contracting parties or awardees (% of total public procurement)	1.2.1.1	Number and value of contracts awarded to large companies $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ large\ companies}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ large\ companies}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	A high percentage reflects behavior that is not SME friendly.	A formal definition of "large company" and "SME" is required.
			1.2.1.2	Number and value of contracts awarded to SMEs	A high percentage	

				$\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ SME}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ SME}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	reflects an SME-friendly environment.	
			1.2.1.3	Number and value of contracts awarded to large foreign companies $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ large\ foreigner\ companies}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ large\ foreigner\ companies}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	A high percentage reflects an open environment that is not SME friendly	A formal definition of "large company" and "SME" is required. The awarded values relate to actual purchases and not estimated ones.
			1.2.1.4	Number and value of contracts awarded to foreign SMEs $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ foreigner\ SME}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ foreigner\ SME}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts}$	A high percentage reflects an environment that is both open and SME-friendly	
			1.2.1.5	Number and value of Framework Agreements (FAs) awarded to SMEs $\frac{Value\ of\ framework\ agreements\ awarded\ to\ SME}{Total\ value\ of\ framework\ agreements} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ framework\ agreements\ awarded\ to\ SME}{Total\ number\ of\ framework\ agreements} \times 100$	A high percentage is desired, indicating that SMEs are supplying routinely purchased items	
MEASURING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEM			2.1.1.1	Average price variation indicator $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(R_i - P_i)}{Number\ of\ contracts\ with\ price\ variation}$	A positive number can indicate either achieved	

PERFORMANCE TO MAKE IT MORE SUSTAINABLE **[second direction]**	Improve public financial management (be effective)	Price reduction/Price variation Savings Indicator		where: R = Buyer's Reserve Price (estimated) P = Awarding Price n = number of contracts with price variation	economies or badly performed estimations. A zero number can indicate that the government spends the budgeted amounts on procurements. A negative number can indicate bad estimations or poor participation.	
			2.1.1.2	Average price reduction indicator $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(R_i - P_i)}{Number\ of\ contracts\ with\ price\ reduction}, S > 0$ R = Buyer's Reserve Price (estimated) P = Awarding Price n = number of contracts with price reduction	A positive number can indicate savings or that originally awarded FA prices were too high. A zero number can indicate that call-offs do not offer financial gains. A negative number can indicate that call-offs result in more expensive prices than	Only for call-off competitions within the context of FAs.

					those awarded at FA.	
			2.1.1.3	Comparison with non e-GP-awarded prices (a sample for showcasing) $\frac{Average\ price\ of\ e-GP\ Contracts}{Average\ price\ of\ contracts}$	The ratio should be less than 1 to indicate savings are achieved by e-GP.	This algorithm relates to data retrieved from both an e-Procurement system and other sources.
			2.1.1.4	Average % of savings in open procedures $\frac{\sum Savings\ (S)\ in\ open\ procedures}{Number\ of\ open\ procedures} \times 100$	An increasing trend indicates improvement in procurement performance and increased savings.	
			2.1.1.5	Average % of savings in e-Auctions $\frac{\sum Savings\ in\ e-auctions}{Number\ of\ e-auctions} \times 100$		
			2.1.1.6	Average % of savings in FAs $\frac{Total\ savings\ in\ framework\ agreements}{Total\ number\ of\ framework\ agreements} \times 100$		
			2.1.1.7	Average % of reduction price at call-off stage $\frac{\sum Price\ Reductions\ \ at\ call-off\ stage}{Number\ of\ framework\ agreements} \times 100$	A low positive number can indicate "reasonable" savings at call-off stage.	The saving is calculated against the contracted FA price and not against the initial budget.

					A high positive number can indicate either FA prices that are too expensive or "unhealthy" competition by Economic Operations (EOs) participating in FAs.	
			2.1.1.8	% of contracts awarded on the basis of lowest price $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ on\ the\ basis\ of\ lowest\ price}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	This value should be decreasing over time.	It should be the objective of any e-GP implementation that "simple" procurements be performed through e-Catalogues. Therefore, lowest price evaluations should be used only for simple procurements not covered in e-Catalogues (which should be diminishing over time).
			2.1.1.9	% of contracts awarded on the basis of most economically advantageous tender $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ on\ the\ basis\ of\ most\ economically\ advantageous\ tender}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	This value should be increasing over time to indicate that price is not the only determining factor when evaluating bids.	
	Improve efficiency of procurement processes	Efficiency Improvement indicator for CAs	2.2.1.1	Average length of pre-award stage (from contract notice to contract award notice) $\frac{\sum Length\ of\ contract's\ pre-award\ stage}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts}$	As users become familiar with the e-GP system, this	

	(be smart)		2.2.1.2	Average length of central purchasing procedures $\frac{\sum Length\ centralised\ procedures}{Total\ number\ of\ centralised\ procedures}$	value should decrease.	
			2.2.1.3	Full-time equivalents (FTEs) per type of procedure		
			2.2.1.4	Administrative cost per type of procedure		Data have to be gathered outside the context of an e-Procurement system.
		Efficiency Improvement indicator for EOs	2.2.2.1	Average length of bid preparations $\frac{\sum Length\ of\ bid\ preparations}{Number\ of\ bids}$	The EOs should also experience cost savings and improvements in efficiency due to e-GP; as such, the lower the values the better.	Length and cost should be provided by EOs if not able to be gathered/calculated automatically by the system.
			2.2.2.2	Average cost per procedure $\frac{\sum Costs\ per\ procedure}{Number\ of\ procedures}$		
			2.2.2.3	Type of electronic authentication required		
			2.2.2.4	Total cost for participating in public procurement procedures (by type of contract)		
		Competition	2.2.3.1	Average number of bidders per type of contract (goods, services, works) $\frac{\sum Bidders\ per\ goods\ contracts}{Number\ of\ goods\ contracts}$ $\frac{\sum Bidders\ per\ services\ contracts}{Number\ of\ services\ contracts}$ $\frac{\sum Bidders\ per\ works\ contracts}{Number\ of\ works\ contracts}$	A higher average indicates a competitive environment; higher competition should correlate with greater savings.	

			2.2.3.2	% of direct awards versus total number and value of public contracts $\frac{Number\ of\ direct\ awarded\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ direct\ awarded\ contracts}{Total\ value\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$	A lower value indicates more competition.	
			2.2.3.3	% of contracts awarded to SMEs in number and value $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ SMEs}{Total\ number\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ SMEs}{Total\ value\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$	A higher percentage indicates an SME-friendly environment.	
			2.2.3.4	% of contracts divided into lots, in number and value $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ divided\ into\ lots}{Total\ number\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ divided\ into\ lots}{Total\ value\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$	Lots are seen as an SME-friendly mechanism to allow SMEs to participate more effectively; the higher the number, the more SME-friendly the environment.	
			2.2.3.5	% of contracts divided into geographical lots $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ divided\ into\ geographical\ lots}{Total\ number\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$		
			2.2.3.6	% of contracts divided into quantitative lots $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ divided\ into\ quantitative\ lots}{Total\ number\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$		

			2.2.3.7	% of subcontracts in number and value per type of contract $\frac{Number\ of\ goods\ subcontracts}{Total\ number\ of\ goods\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ goods\ subcontracts}{Total\ value\ of\ goods\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ services\ subcontracts}{Total\ number\ of\ services\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ services\ subcontracts}{Total\ value\ of\ services\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of\ works\ subcontracts}{Total\ number\ of\ works\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ works\ subcontracts}{Total\ value\ of\ works\ contracts} \times 100$	Subcontracting is seen as an SME-friendly mechanism to allow SMEs to participate more effectively; thus, the higher the number, the more SME-friendly the environment.	This can generally only be measured post-implementation, as the subcontractors used are not always specified in advance.
			2.2.3.8	% of contracts awarded to consortia (grouping), number and value $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ consortia\ (grouping)}{Total\ number\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ consortia\ (grouping)}{Total\ value\ of\ public\ contracts} \times 100$	Consortia are generally made up of SMEs as a way to enable them to participate in large tenders; hence the higher the number, the more SME-friendly the environment.	
			2.2.3.9	Average ratio between required economic and financial capacity (e.g., annual turnover, net income, etc.) AND estimated contract value	A lower value indicates a more SME-friendly stance;	

				$\frac{\sum\left[\frac{Financial\ capacity\ requirement}{Contract\ value}\right]}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts}$	a higher value implies higher quality, as more financially stable suppliers are desired.	
			2.2.3.10	% of abnormally low tenders $\frac{Number\ of\ abnormally\ low\ tenders}{Total\ number\ of\ bids} \times 100$	This figure should be low, as abnormally low bids indicate flawed procedures.	
	Improve environmentally responsible procurement (be strategic)	% of environmentally responsible contracts (% of total public procurement)	2.3.1.1	Value and number of contracts in which formation procedure has included environment-related features or characteristics as technical specifications (not subject to competition/evaluation) $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ with\ environmental\ technical\ specifications}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ with\ environmental\ technical\ specifications}{Value\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	The higher the figure, the more that environmental concerns are reflected in public procurements.	The evaluation of bids should not be based solely on the lowest price but should also consider quality factors relating to the environment.
			2.3.1.2	Value and number of contracts in which formation procedure has included environment-related selection or award criteria $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ with\ environmental\ related\ selection\ or\ award\ criteria}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ with\ environmental\ related\ selection\ or\ award\ criteria}{Value\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$		

			2.3.1.3	Value and number of contracts awarded following a procedure containing life-cycle costing award criteria $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ following\ a\ life-cycle\ award\ criterion}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ following\ a\ life-cycle\ award\ criterion}{Value\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	A higher percentage reflects that total cost of ownership (TCO) is being evaluated instead of just up-front purchase price.	
	Improve socially responsible procurement (be strategic)	% of socially responsible contracts (% of total public procurement)	2.4.1.1	Value and number of contracts in which formation procedure has included social concerns-related features or characteristics as technical specifications (not subject to competition/evaluation-"must have") $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ with\ social\ related\ features}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ with\ social\ related\ features}{Value\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	The higher the figure, the more that social concerns are reflected in public procurements.	The evaluation of bids should not be based solely on the lowest price but should also consider quality factors relating to social concerns.
			2.4.1.2	Value and number of contracts which formation procedure has included social concerns–related selection or award criteria—"to be evaluated/scored" $\frac{Number\ of\ contracts\ with\ social\ related\ selection\ or\ award\ criteria}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ with\ social\ related\ selection\ or\ award\ criteria}{Value\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$		
	Fair and equal treatment		2.5.1.1	% of contracts subject to non-judicial review	A decreasing trend is	Percentage, numbers, and

	(be fair)			$\frac{Non-judicial\ reviews}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	desired, indicating that EOs trust the fairness of the procurement process.	values should be provided by CAs if they cannot be gathered/calculated automatically by the system.
			2.5.1.2	% of contracts subject to court appeals $\frac{Number\ of\ court\ appeals}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$		
			2.5.1.3	Number of appeals per year		
			2.5.1.4	Average value of contracts giving rise to dispute $\frac{\sum Value\ of\ contracts\ giving\ rise\ to\ dispute}{Number\ of\ contracts\ giving\ rise\ to\ dispute}$		
			2.5.1.5	Average length of review procedures $\frac{\sum Length\ of\ review\ procedures}{Number\ of\ review\ procedures}$		
		Litigation indicator	2.5.1.6	Average length of appeal procedures $\frac{\sum Length\ of\ appeal\ procedures}{Number\ of\ appeal\ procedures}$	A decreasing trend reflects improved effectiveness.	
			2.5.1.7	CA/EO winning rate (% of total) review $\frac{Reviews\ won\ by\ Contracting\ Authorities}{Total\ number\ of\ reviews} \times 100$ $\frac{Reviews\ won\ by\ Economic\ Operators}{Total\ number\ of\ reviews} \times 100$	A high ratio of CA wins indicates that the procedures are legally sound and executed correctly, but EOs do not "trust" public procurement proceedings.	
			2.5.1.8	CA/EO winning rate (% of total) court appeals $\frac{Court\ appeals\ won\ by\ Contracting\ Authorities}{Total\ number\ of\ court\ appeals} \times 100$ $\frac{Court\ appeals\ won\ by\ Economic\ Operators}{Total\ number\ of\ court\ appeals} \times 100$		

	Foster transparency (be open)	Monitoring and auditing	2.6.1.1	Value and number of ex-ante (before awarding decision) controlling procedures (% of total) $\frac{Number\ of\ ex-ante\ controlling\ procedures}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of\ ex-ante\ controlling\ procedures}{Value\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	This should a low positive number.	These procedures are often legislated and provide procurement checkpoints. They are often not declared, so data may be difficult to source.
			2.6.1.2	Value and number of compliance audits $\frac{Value\ of\ compliance\ audits}{Value\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Number\ of compliance\ audits}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	As users become familiar with e-GP, these values should increase.	
			2.6.1.3	Average length of audits (months) $\frac{\sum Length\ of\ audits}{Number\ of\ audits}$	A decreasing trend reflects improved effectiveness.	
		Transparency indicator	2.6.2.1	Number and value of tenders published on the web (% of total procurement) $\frac{Number\ of tenders\ published\ on\ the\ web}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of tenders\ published\ on\ the\ web}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	This figure should be close to 100 when e-GP is fully adopted and mandated.	This algorithm relates to data retrieved from both an e-Procurement system and other sources.
			2.6.2.2	Public access to information on all tender stages	Measures the completeness of information being published.	

			2.6.2.3	Quality of information per type of contract and stage of procedure provided and accessible to EOs and CAs (rank 1 to 5)	If Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) has been implemented, the OCDS publisher rating can be used to indicate the quality of information being made available.	
		Ease of access	2.6.3.1	% of contracts reserved to national bidders $\frac{Number\ of contracts\ reserved\ to\ national\ bidders}{Total\ number\ of\ contracts} \times 100$ $\frac{Value\ of contracts\ reserved\ to\ national\ bidders}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts} \times 100$	A higher number indicates local market development. A lower number indicates an open environment.	
	Stakeholder barometer (attitudinal indicators on reforms) (be involved)	Attitudinal indicator demand side (CAs)	2.7.1.1	Top five perceived benefits of e-GP	These measures are used to promote the value of e-GP as well as to implement actions to minimize adoption barriers.	The questions in the survey must be neutrally worded so as not to guide the respondent toward a specific response.
			2.7.1.2	Top five perceived barriers to the adoption of e-GP		
		Attitudinal indicator supply side (EOs)	2.7.2.1	Top five perceived benefits of e-GP		
			2.7.2.2	Top five perceived barriers to the adoption of e-GP		
INCREASE USE OF E-GP IN WB-	Increase use of e-GP in WB-	% increase of WB-funded	3.1.1.1	Total Value of WB-funded contracts		
			3.1.1.2	Total Number of WB-funded contracts		

FUNDED PROJECTS **[third direction]**	funded projects by implementing agencies	contracts formed through e-Submission in value and number	3.1.1.3	Average value of WB-funded contracts by type of contract (goods, services, works) $\frac{\sum Value\ of\ WB-funded\ goods\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ WB-funded\ goods\ contracts}$ $\frac{\sum Value\ of\ WB-funded\ services\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ WB-funded\ services\ contracts}$ $\frac{\sum Value\ of\ WB-funded\ works\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ WB-funded\ works\ contracts}$	An increasing trend indicates that e-GP is being used for WB-funded projects to a greater extent.	
			3.1.1.4	Average value of WB-funded contracts by type of procedure (International Competitive Bidding/Limited International Bidding/National Competitive Bidding/Shopping/FAs/Direct Contracting) $\frac{\sum Value\ of\ WB-funded\ contracts}{Total\ number\ of\ WB-funded\ contracts}$		

TABLE 1: WORLD BANK PROCUREMENT INDICATOR

3 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PROCUREMENT INDICATORS

The e-Procurement Preparation module introduces a number of strategic objectives for e-GP implementation. These strategic objectives can be mapped to the WB procurement indicators to show which indicators can be used to reflect each particular strategic objective.

INDICATOR / STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE		Governance	Institutional Capacity	Functionality & Infrastructure	Interoperability	Adoption
1.1.1.1	Value of contracts awarded through e-Submission			✓		✓
1.1.1.2	Value of goods, services, and works contracts awarded through e-Submission			✓		✓
1.1.1.3	Value of contracts awarded by a CPB or through a centralized purchasing arrangement			✓		
1.1.2.1	Number of contracts awarded through e-Submission			✓		✓
1.1.2.2	Number of goods, services, and works contracts awarded through e-Submission			✓		✓
1.1.2.3	Number of contracts awarded through a centralized versus decentralized process			✓		
1.2.1.1	Number and value of contracts awarded to large companies			✓	✓	
1.2.1.2	Number and value of contracts awarded to SMEs			✓	✓	
1.2.1.3	Number and value of contracts awarded to large foreign companies			✓	✓	
1.2.1.4	Number and value of contracts awarded to foreign SMEs			✓	✓	
1.2.1.5	Number and value of FAs awarded to SMEs			✓	✓	
2.1.1.1	Average price variation indicator			✓		
2.1.1.2	Average price reduction indicator			✓		
2.1.1.3	Comparison with non-e-GP-awarded prices (a sample for showcasing)			✓		✓
2.1.1.4	Average % of savings in open procedures			✓		✓
2.1.1.5	Average % of savings in e-Auctions			✓		✓
2.1.1.6	Average % of savings in FAs			✓		✓
2.1.1.7	Average % of reduction in price at call-off stage			✓		✓
2.1.1.8	% of contracts awarded on the basis of lowest price			✓		✓
2.1.1.9	% of contracts awarded on the basis of most economically advantageous tender			✓		✓
2.2.1.1	Average length of pre-award stage (from contract notice to contract award notice)			✓		✓

2.2.1.2	Average length of central purchasing procedures			✓		✓
2.2.1.3	FTEs per type of procedure	✓	✓			
2.2.1.4	Administrative cost per type of procedure	✓	✓			
2.2.2.1	Average length of bid preparations	✓	✓			
2.2.2.2	Average cost per procedure	✓	✓			
2.2.2.3	Type of electronic authentication required		✓		✓	✓
2.2.2.4	Total cost for participating in public procurement procedures (by type of contract)		✓			
2.2.3.1	Average number of bidders per type of contract (goods, services, works)			✓		✓
2.2.3.2	% of direct awards versus total number and value of public contracts	✓		✓		✓
2.2.3.3	% of contracts awarded to SMEs, in number and value			✓	✓	✓
2.2.3.4	% of contracts divided into lots, in number and value			✓		
2.2.3.5	% of contracts divided into geographical lots			✓		
2.2.3.6	% of contracts divided into quantitative lots			✓		
2.2.3.7	% of subcontracts in number and value per type of contract			✓		
2.2.3.8	% of contracts awarded to consortia (grouping) in number and value			✓		
2.2.3.9	Average ratio between required economic and financial capacity (e.g., annual turnover, net income, etc.) AND estimated contract value		✓	✓		
2.2.3.10	% of abnormally low tenders			✓		
2.3.1.1	Value and number of contracts in which formation procedure has included environment-related features or characteristics as technical specifications (not subject to competition/evaluation)	✓		✓		
2.3.1.2	Value and number of contracts in which formation procedure has included environment-related selection or award criteria	✓		✓		
2.3.1.3	Value and number of contracts awarded following a procedure containing life-cycle costing award criteria	✓		✓		
2.4.1.1	Value and number of contracts in which formation procedure has included social concerns–related features or characteristics as technical specifications (not subject to competition/evaluation—“must have”)	✓		✓		
2.4.1.2	Value and number of contracts in which formation procedure has included social concerns–related selection or award criteria—“to be evaluated/scored”	✓		✓		
2.5.1.1	% of contracts subject to non-judicial review	✓				

2.5.1.2	% of contracts subject to court appeals	✓				
2.5.1.3	Number of appeals per year	✓				
2.5.1.4	Average value of contracts giving rise to dispute	✓				
2.5.1.5	Average length of review procedures	✓				
2.5.1.6	Average length of appeal procedures	✓				
2.5.1.7	CA/EO winning rate (% of total) review	✓				
2.5.1.8	CA/EO winning rate (% of total) court appeals	✓				
2.6.1.1	Value and number of ex-ante (before awarding decision) controlling procedures (% of total)	✓				
2.6.1.2	Value and number of compliance audits	✓		✓		
2.6.1.3	Average length of audits (months)	✓		✓		
2.6.2.1	Number and value of tenders published on the web (% of total procurement)	✓		✓	✓	
2.6.2.2	Public access to information on all tender stages	✓		✓	✓	
2.6.2.3	Quality of information per type of contract and stage of procedure provided and accessible to EOs and CAs (rank 1 to 5)	✓		✓	✓	
2.6.3.1	% of contracts reserved to national bidders	✓		✓		
2.7.1.1	Top five perceived benefits of e-GP (CAs)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2.7.1.2	Top five perceived barriers to the adoption of e-GP (CAs)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2.7.2.1	Top five perceived benefits of e-GP (EOs)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2.7.2.2	Top five perceived barriers to the adoption of e-GP (EOs)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3.1.1.1	Total value of WB-funded contracts			✓		
3.1.1.2	Total number of WB-funded contracts			✓		
3.1.1.3	Average value of WB-funded contracts by type of contract (goods, services, works)			✓		
3.1.1.4	Average value of WB-funded contracts by type of procedure (ICB/LIB/NCB/Shopping/FAs/Direct Contracting)			✓		

TABLE 2: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PROCUREMENT INDICATORS

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World Bank. 2015. “Promoting E-Government Procurement (E-GP) - Strategy and Role of World Bank in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Countries.” World Bank, Washington, DC.

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